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PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT: SOME CRITICAL THOUGHTS 1 
by JEREMY BOISSEVAIN 
THE issue of a majority electoral system versus proportional rep-
resentation has been debated for years. 2 It rears its head after 
every British. election, and it is increasingly discussed in Malta. 
But the effects of electoral systems on local government have all 
but been ignored, as have the respective merits of the systems in 
underdeveloped areas. 
The partisans of proportional representation (P.R.) maintain that 
it is more democratic because it allows all significant segments 
of public opinion to be represented in proportion to the popular 
vote they receive. They hold that this results in a continuum of 
opinion in parliament, and that therefore the divisions in -the so-
ciety will be less pronounced and bitter. This results in a greater 
degree of co-operation, an important factor if no single party is in 
a commanding position. Finally, because the system provides for 
a large choice of candidates who advocate diverse points of view, 
there is less need to form new parties in order to promote particu-
lEarlier drafts of this paper were read to a seminar at the University of 
Sussex, and discussed at the Mediterranean Social Sciences Research 
Council conference on local and regional factors influencing national de-
velopment, held in Malta, December 13-16, 1965 and subsequently pub-
lished in the Journal of Development Studies (Boissevain 1971). The Si-
cilian field work in 1962/63 upon which much of argument is based was 
greatly assisted by the generosity of the Centro Regionale per 10 Svilup-
po di Comunid_ through the good offices of Rev.S.Duynstee, the Penrose 
fund of the American Philosophical Society and the Co-operative for 
American Relief to Everywhere (C.A.R.E., Inc.). A return trip to Sicily 
during the summer of 1965 was made possible by a Faculty Research 
grant from the Social Science Research Council. Mart Bax further stimu-
lated my thinking on the argument and suggested additional literature. 
2 An abundant literature exists on the subject in so far as it relates to 
government at the national level (Lakeman, 1955, pp. 296-8; MacKenzie. 
1958, pp. 177-80), 
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lar views. They also indicate that the system is universally ap-
plicable; that because it is more democratic, it is better (Lakeman, 
1955, pp. 198ff., 431-3).3 They do not accept the criticism of their 
opponents that it leads to the multiplication of factions and parties 
which in turn result in unstable and ineffective government. Lake-
man and Lambert, for example, after examining its effects on the 
governments of 13 countries, conclude categorically that propor-
tional representation does not lead to an in-ordinate multiplicity 
of parties or to unstable government. They claim that in no country 
previously free from them have these disadvantages developed 
through changing to a proportional system (Lakeman, 1955, p. 
198).4 
What I propose to do now is to examine the consequences that 
the introduction of proportional representation in 1960 have had 
upon local government in Sicily, which until then had been direct-
ed by town councils elected according to a majority system. Since 
I shall be examining the conclusions of Lakeman and Lambert, ,it 
will be useful to keep in mind the four purposes which they sug-
gest are the raison d' etre for the establishment of elections: '(i) A 
parliament reflecting the main trends of opinion within the elec-
torate. (ii) Government according to the wishes of the majority of 
the electorate. (iii) The election of representatives whose person-
al qualities best fit them for the function of government. (iv) Strong 
and stable government' (Lakeman, 1955, p.24). 
MUNICIP AL GOVERNMENT 
Leone, a pseudonym for the Sicilian town in which I carried out 
3The position of those who advocate proportional-representation has been 
forcefully expressed by Professor J.F .S. Ross: 
It seems probable that, if they once really grasped the nature of the is-
sue, most democratically minded people would become convinced ~p­
holders of the representative princ iple and would, moreover, be un-
able to see in it anything incompatible with good and efficient govern-
ment (Ross, 1955, p. 10). 
4Cf. Duverger (1963, pp. 245-55), however, who points out that P.R. fa-
vours multi-partism and particularly the emergency of small parties. More-
over, 'in the few local elections in which proportional representation has 
from time to time been tried it shattered the two-party system' (Duverger, 
196.3, pp. 218-70). 
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field work in 1962/63, is an agro-town of 20,000. Civil authority is 
exercised by the mayor, the magistrate and the carabinien. The ma-
yor is one of the 32 councillors who make up the Leone town coun-
cil, which is elected every five years (before 1964 it was every 
four years) by universal adult suffrage. They ~in turn choose from 
among themselves the mayor and the five assessori who assist him 
and with him form the executive giunta. The junta makes all deci-
sions regarding local affairs. The full town council meets only a 
few times a year, to discuss matters of major policy. 
All employees of the Town Hall are appointed by the junta with 
the approval of the provincial authorities. The only exception is 
the municipal secretary, .an outside administrative officer posted 
to the town by the National Ministry of the Interior. But the as-
sistant-secretary, a Leonese, has in fact been the acting secretary 
for years, since the municipality has not found a qualified person 
willing to serve there, as the town has a reputation of being a try-
ing place in which to work. All the other men who work in the 
Town Hall are Leonesi. 
The post-war political history of Leone may be divided in two: 
the period of Socialist control which lasted until 1958, and the un-
stable administration following that. From the end of the war until 
1958 Leone was governed by a 'red' junta composed of the Socia-
lists (P.S.I.) supported by the Communists (P.C.I.). It was oppos-
posed by a bloc formed of the Christian Democrats (D.C.) and the 
minor parties such as the Fascists (M.S.I.). Until 1960 each. bloc 
contested the elections with a unified list of candidates. In spite 
of its very slender electoral majority the Socialist-Communist bloc 
maintained a clear majority in the town council, where it held 24 
out of the 32 seats. The resul ts of the post-war elections for the 
town council are given below in Tables I and IIs 
S Further details about Leone and the National and regional elections In 
town may be found in Boissevain (1966b). 
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Table I 
LEONE TOWN COUNCIL ELECTION RESULTS 
(PERCENT OF VALID VOTES) 
DC- PCI- DC PCI PSI MSI PSDI USCS PRI PSIUP MISC. TOTAL 
MSI PSI 
1946 42 58 
1953 46 54 
1956 49.7 50.3 
1960 31 30 20 8 
1964 31 25 21 8 
1 
7 
Table n 
9 
3 3 
LEONE MUNICIPAL COUNCILLORS 
1 
2 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
DC- PCI- DC PCI PSI MSI PSDI USCS PRI PSIUP MISC. TOTAL 
MSI PSI % 
1946 8 
1953 8 
1956 8 
1960 
1964 
24 
24 
24 
10 10 7 
11 9 7 
2 
2 
3 
2 1 
32 
32 
32 
32 
32 
The P.S.I. - P.c.I. bloc held its stable majority in the town 
council thanks to the electoral system then in effect. This was a 
majority list system with provision for cross-voting for which the 
whole town formed a single constituency. To ensure that the win-
ning list had a strong working majority in the town council its 
strength was multiplied: the majority list regardless of the size of 
its winning margin automatically received three-quarters of the 
seats on the counci 1 (24 out of 32). The remainder were given 
to the candidates with the most preferential votes on the rival (or 
next most successful) list. 
In short, this simple majority system which multiplied the 
strength of the majority list (50.1 per cent of the votes would win 
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75 per cent of the seats) insured administrative stability (in theory 
and usually in practice) until the next election, for to bring the 
junta down required at least 9 councillors to pass to the opposi-
tion, ~n unlikely occurrence. The constant pressure by the opposi-
tion to ge.t councillors to defect, and so to bring down the junta, a 
manoeuvre which became common following 1960, was minimized 
~y the assured large majority of the coalition forming the adminis-
tration. 
The Socialist control over the junta ended in 1958 following a 
long and better law suit which arose out of the 1956 municipal 
elections. This election was extremely close. The difference bet-
ween the two coalitions was a matter of only 53· votes (4,587 to 
4,534). Trouble arose when one of the supervising officials «for-
got' to countersign the returns from one of the town's voting dis-
tricts. The Socialists and Communists claim that this was done 
by design. The Christian Democrats maintain it was by oversight, 
and promptly filed suit to have the votes declared invalid. This 
would have given the majority in the town to the list presented by 
the D.e. and its allies. The case was finally tried in 1958. The 
court awarded costs against the Socialists, but declared the entire 
election void. The provincial Prefect ordered the Socialist junta 
to resign, and appointed a commissioner to take over the town's 
administration. 
ELECTORAL REFORM 
Just before the 1960 l!1Unicipal elections the Regional Govern-
ment, under pressure from most of the parties to limit the power 
of the Christian Democrats in m.unicipal politics, replaced the ma-
jority system described above with a form of proportional repre-
sentation (the Hondt method) in all towns with populations exceed-
ing 5,000. This, of course, affected Leone, although, in contrast 
to most Sicilian towns, it had been run by a red coalition. Hence-
forth the number of councillors elected from each party was to be 
in proportion to the total popular votes each party received. It 
thus became possible for even the small parties to be represented 
on the council. 
The immediate result of the new law was to divide the two op-
posing blocs into their constituent parties, splitting the Commu-
nists from the Socialists, and freeing the Fascists and other small 
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parties from their dependence on the Christian Democrats. Hence-
forth each could gain a place on the council without having to go 
into coalition to fight the election. But because the alignment of 
parties on the Left was evenly matched by the conservati ve par-
ties, the small parties and factions began to play a role out of pro-
portion ot their numerical strength. In this respect the admini stra-
tive junta began to reflect the situation prevailing at the regi.onal 
and national level where proportional representation had been in 
use since the war. It now became possible for the small parties, 
factions of the larger ones and even individual councillors to play 
the Left off against the Right, and so to enter the munici pal j un ta. 
Thus the proportional system of voting introduced an element of 
instability into the local scene which. in contrast to the unstable 
national and regional situation. had hitherto been characterized by 
its stability. The administrative junta became a fragile coalition 
which depended upon the support of the minor parties and, at times, 
upon the whims of a single councillor. As a result, there was 
great instability: from November 1960 to May 1963 five different 
coalitions ran the affairs of the town~ 
POLITICAL MUSICAL CHAIRS 
As the 1960 election was the first time the votes of the Commu-
nist surpassed the Socialists, the first coalition was formed by 
the ten Communist councillors with the reluctant support of the se-
ven Socialists. The Socialists leaders, who were far better edu-
cated than their Communist rivals, refused to participate in the 
junta as they considered the Communists incapable of running the 
town's administration. The Communists thus formed the junta by 
themselves, and the town's professional class politicans sat back 
to watch the 'peasants' make a mess of the administration. Various 
mafiosi also began to try and force the Communist mayor to resign. 
As the Communist Party was the only political party in Sicily 
which consistently and openly attacked the mafia and whose lea-
ders by and large rejected its support, the new Communist admi-
nistration was a threat to the personal int~rests of the local ma-
fiosi as well as to those whom they normally protected. 
The Communists proved to be fairly efficient. In spite of their 
inexperience they worked hard and were honest. The Communist 
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junta did not destroy itself by its administrative incapacity. In 
spite of vicious anonymous letters threatening his life, the mayor 
remained in office. The junta's downfall came from quite a differ-
ent direction. 
The coalition had a majority of only one. To bring it down and 
form a new junta, its enemies needed to find two councillors wil-
ling to cross the floor. Within three months they had located seve-
ral weak members' of the governing coalition. Two cousins, both 
members of the middle class, one of whom was a member of the 
junta, left the Communist Party and joined the Christian Democ-
rats. According to town gossip, one changed because he was giv-
en a white-collar job in the provincial capital thrc:mgh the inter-
vention of a D.C Deputy. The other is alleged to have received 
sizeable scholarships for .his sons from an exclusive church-run 
college. When asked about this sudden change, one replied that 
it was his duty to think of the well-being and advancement of his 
family. (Their behaviour, if true, may be contrasted with the sacri-
fice of the peasant assessore of public works. Although he receiv-
ed no remuneration from the municipality (only the mayor receives 
a stipend) he none the less left his steady employment as a la-
bourer in a stone quarry in order to carry out his new administra-
tive assig·nment. He was personally quiet relieved when the junta 
fell so that he could go back to work to support his family and pay 
off the debts he had accumulated). 
At about the same time two other members of the Communist 
junta, including the Party's only professional-class member, pass-
ed to the Saragat Socialists (P.S.D.I.). At the vote on the annual 
budget, three Socialists also voted against the junta. According to 
town gossip, once again, this was in response to ma/ia pressure. 
Thus defeated 22 to 10, the Communist junta resigned. 6 
The second junta was elected by the 12 D.C councillors with 
the support of the three U.S.CS. councillors and the two Fascists. 
Again there was a majority of only one. The junta itself was com-
posed of three Christian Democrats, a Fascist and a member of 
6The balloting for the election of a mayor is secret. This and subsequent 
reports on the actual voting are therefore based upon the opinions of a 
wide cross-section of informants who believed the voting had gone this 
way. 
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the U.S.C.S. (a regional party which split from the D.C but has 
since disappeared). The mayor was Christian Democrat as was the 
vice-mayor, who was one of the two ex-Communists who had cros-
sed over to the D.C. This appointment is alleged to have been 
part of the bargain he made when he left the Communists and join-
ed the Christian Democrats. This combination lasted eight months. 
It was destroyed through'the manoeuvring of the young secretary of 
the Christian Democrat Party in Leone. He wished to form a new 
junta in combination with the Socialists, with himself as mayor. 
This was ostensibly in accordance with his party's directives to 
create local alliances with the Socialists in imitation of the new 
formed Centro-Sinistro (Centre-Left) alliance between the two at 
the national level. The members of the faction headed by the D.C. 
secretary voted against their colleague on the budget, and brought 
the second junta crashing down. 
The third junta was not led by the D.C. secretary, much to his 
disgust, but by the leader of the U.S.C.S~, a respected lawyer and 
a former secretary of the D.C He was el'ected by the three votes 
of his own party, the two Fascists and the seven members of the 
conservative faction in the D.C. headed, by the outgoing mayor, as 
well as by five Socialists councillors who opposed the idea of a 
local Centro-Sinistra in general, and the mayorship of the ambit-
ious D.C. party secretary in particular. These provided the neces-
sary 17 votes. Again there was a majority of only one. This unlike-
ly combination lasted only a few ,months bef6re it fell apart over 
the vote on its budget. 
The fourth junta was formed by the seven Socialists and three 
U.S.CS. with the external support of the six Communists. This 
provided a total of 16 votes. The crucial 17th vote was furnished 
by the vice-mayor of the previous junta, a prominent member of the 
D.C., who in return for betraying his party was made vice-mayor 
in the new administration. Thus the Socialists resumed the admi-
nistration of the town after an interval of four years. 
Meanwhile the secretary of the D.C, with the help of the party's 
provincial secretary, who threatened mem bers of the anti-Centro-
Sinistra faction of the party with expulsion, succeeded in whip-
ping the party back in line. That is, all save the vice-mayor, who 
was thrown out of the party for his treason, becoming an 'indepen-
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dent' councillor. The astute D.e. secretary had also managed to 
secure the support of three Socialists, including the local Socialist 
secretary, to whom he offered the post of vice-mayor. He also lin-
ed up the co-operation of two ex-Communists councillors who had 
become Saragat Socialists, as well as the two Fascists. Moreover, 
two of the three U.S.C.S. councillors rejoined the D.C., from 
which they had broken several years before. The third became an 
'independent'. The U.S.C.S. thus ceased to exist as a local party. 
Three months after Socialist junta took office, the D.e. secretary, 
with 20 votes committed to him, was strong enough to defeat the 
Socialist mayor over his budget. 
The fifth junta, headed by the D.e. secretary and formed of rep-
resentatives of all the local parties save the Communists, got off 
to a difficult start. The Provincial "Federation of the Socialist par-
ty became so ~nraged with its Leone secretary for entering as vice-
mfiyor in a junta with a Fascist, that it ordered him to withdraw 
under pain of expulsion from the party. But, I was given to under-
stand, it relented somewhat when it learned that certain mafiosi 
had threatened to make life for the new vice-mayor very disagree-
able (if not also short) if he did resign. I left the town at this 
point in its poli.tical history. 
The inherent instability of the municipal junta which followed 
the introduction of the new 'democratic' electoral law, has had 
important repercussions on the internal politics of Leone, as well 
as on the quality of its local administration. Instead of having a 
stable working majority, the life of each junta often depends upon 
a single vote. This has given increased power to individual coun-
cillors: each councillor supporting the junta has the power to des-
troy it. His vote thus becomes a weapon with which he can threat-
en the junta. Councillors have exercised this power to the detri-
ment of the town. 
MALADMINIS TRA TION 
The constantly changing responsibility for the town's affairs 
weakened administrative control in Leone, and made planning im-
possible. Because members of the junta know they will not be in 
power long, they usually, work to draw the maximum advantage out 
of their positions for themselves, their families, their protectors 
and their clients. They have little to fear from public opinion by 
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acting in this way: the public assumes that they are doing just this. 
Discovery of some questionable affair merely confirms the belief 
already held. The result has been an escalating maladministration. 
The case of the family tax provides a good example of how re-
ceptiveness to a constant series of pressures affects municipal af-
fairs. Each family is supposed to pay a small annual tax b~sed on 
its income. 7 In 1958 under the stable Socialist administration, the 
town collected approximately 10,000,000 lire annually. Since then 
no junta has had the strength to enforce this law, or to exercise a 
tight control over municipal business. The result has been that a 
constant stream of relatives, friends and friends-of-friends, work-
ing through town concillors and municipal employees, have suc-
ceeded in amending the tax assessment records to the point where 
in 1963 only about 3,000,000 lira were being actually collected 
each year. This in spite of the great increase in the income levels 
and standard of living during the same period. 
The lack of control over the town's government and the increased 
vulnerability of the junta has brought about a progressive wastage 
of the town's already limited resources. The total debt of the 
town, which stood at 30,000,000 lira in 1958, had risen to a stag-
gering 310,000,000 lira by 1963. Moreover, it was increasing by 
some 77,600,000 lira annually. The town had all but exhausted its 
credit sources; the chronic deadlock over its budget further limit-
ed its credit with the regional government. One of the results of 
this depressing financial situation is that municipal employees 
are paid only two or three times a year, and then only after pro-
longed and often bitter strikes. These paralyse local affairs for as 
long as three months at a time. 
Even when they are not on strike, the municipal police have 
ceased to enforce local ordinances effectively. All a person has 
to do to have a traffic or building code violation suppressed.is to 
go and see his protector on the town council. He, in turn, sees the 
member concerned of the junta. If the latter does not quash the 
charges, the protector threatens to withdraw his support of the 
junta and so to destroy it. Faced with. this alternative, the asses-
sore tears up the charge. 
7 This is collected for the municipality by an agency to which the muni-
cipal taxes determined by the Town Hall have been farmed. 
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'It's got to the point where the police don'r even bother to issue 
the summons any more,' an informant exclaimed. 'POTca miseria! 
These rotten politicians are ruining the town with their dirty 
games and personal ambitions. What we need is a strong hand to 
clean them up'. He then sighed wistfully for Mussolini. 
We thus have the paradox of the more democratic 1960 electoral 
law making it easier for self-seeking politicians to manipulate the 
system for their own benefit, thus bringing greater administrative 
chaos to the affairs of the town. Moreover, the members of the 
junta have been too preoccupied with their own political survival 
to be able to apply pressure on pattons in Palermo to obtain the 
development funds to which the town is entitled. They see little 
point in trying to do this as in all likelihood they would no longer 
be in office when the funds were released, a fact which their 
friends in Palermo also recognize. The administrative instability 
has thus even stifled party initiative motivated by self interest. 
As· long as this situation prevails, Leone is patently incapable of 
solving its many development problem.s by working through its 
elected leaders. Though in 1963 the mass of the people had a bet-
ter income and a higher standard of living than ever before -
thanks to increased gov~rnment social benefits and the added in-
come from emigrant labour - the municipality was poorer and its 
affairs more thoroughly disorganised than before 1958, when people 
were living in appalling misery. A paradxox which just confirms 
the popular belief that all govemmeat is corrupt. 
But it must not be thought that this administrative instability 
and maladministration are limited to West Sicilian municipalities 
which have a system of proportional representation. Here I have 
argued that P.R. favours instability and mal administration more 
than a majority system does. It is not the only cause of these 
problems. They are ills which affect municipal administration 
throughout the South of Italy.8 
8 Cf. C.C.E. (1965. Ch.9), I.S.P .E.S. (1964) and reports on municipal 
cri si appearing in regional newspapers. N. T. Colclough, in a fasc in ating 
recent study (1969), shows that even in a small farming village using a 
majoriry system, the local administration is far from rose-coloured. Al-
though the successive municipal administrations stay in ,power longer 
than in Leone, they too are characterized by malgovernment, and interal 
factionalism makes long-term administrative planning all but impossible 
CColclough, 1969, p.202). 11 
DISCUSSION 
At this point we may ask how many of Lakeman and Lambert's 
electoral objectives the introduction of proportional representation 
has attained in Sicily. I suggest only one, and that with reserva-
tions. To begin with, it does not furnish 'government according to 
the wishes of the people'. Nor does it provide for the electio"n of 
'representatives whose personal qualities best fit them for the 
function of government'. Finally, it most certainly does not ensure 
a 'strong and stable government'. Though municipal councils do 
'reflect the main trends of opinion within the electorate', the minor 
parties exercise power out of all proportion to their electoral 
strength. The result is thus not proportional, .but disproportional 
repre sent ation. 
Why does proportional representation not appear to work in Sici-
ly? Professor Mackenzie has suggested that among the minimum 
conditions necessary to introduce free elections is 
A general acceptance throughout the political community of 
certain rather vague rules of the game, which limit the strug-
gle for power because of some unspoken sentiment that if the 
rules are not observed more or less faithfully, the game itself 
will disappear amid the wreckage of the whole system (Ma-
ckenzie, 1958, p. 24). 
In Sicily, quite simply, people don't play the game according to 
the rules suggested by the scholarly advocates of proportional 
representation. These, for the most part, are academics in the old-
er nation-states of North West Europe. Moreover, there is little 
fear at the moment that because they do use the same rules, the 
'game itself will disappear amid the wreckage of the system'. The 
game as well as the system are propped up by the Italian constitu-
tion, the Ministry of the Interior and the sacred but unanalysed no-
tion that what is more democratic is better. Since they assume the 
system cannot collapse, they play the game according to the rule 
which is traditional to Scicilian society: namely, that a man's 
first and ultimate responsibility is to "provide for and safe-guard 
his own interests and those of his family. The North European no-
tion that a person owes something to the political community, and 
thus should use a different set of rules is foreign. It conflicts di-
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recdy with his responsibility to his family and with the belief that 
all others are looking out for their own interests first. 
CONCLUSION 
The object of this paper is to urge law makers in developing 
countries to consider the harmful effects that proportional repre-
sentation may have in the field of development. Some of the prob-
lems to which I have pointed are inherent in all democratic sys-
tems. None the less, a majority system can ensure somewhat more 
stability, thus allowing for greater administrative continuity than 
proportional representation. Moreover, a system which ensures the 
winner of a sizeable majority reduces the power of politicians to 
manipulate the system to their own advantage, for individual de-
fections cannot as easily endanger the viability of the government. 
Under such circumstances, politicians have less leverage with 
which to force concessions. An electoral system which provides 
for some measure of administrative continuity and limits the power 
of politicians to corrupt civil servants and to loot are important 
considerations for countries concerned with implementing develop-
ment policies and with safeguarding their scarce resources. 
Poorer countries should thus consider carefully the impact of 
electoral systems on their development potential. What is more de-
mocratic _ is not necessarily better for the development of the 
country. This seems to be amply borne out by the large number of 
military dictatorships and one-party political systems which in so 
many newly independent countries have eliminated democratic 
electoral systems patterned too closely on those of the West, 
largely because they led to administrative chaos and political 
looting. Thus a surfeit of democracy - and some systems of pro-
portional representation surely provide extreme forms - often con-
tains the seed- of its own destruction. 
It may be argued that there are other forms of Proportional Rep-
resentation than the pure party list system employed in Italian na-
tional and local elections. The P. R. sy stem used in Malta is often 
mentioned as an ideal form. This is Proportional Representation 
with the single transferable vote. Besides in Malta, it is also used 
in national elections in the Republic of ·Ireland and Tasmania. 
Enid Lakeman has argued that this system of P.R. tends to pro-
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duce only a few parties each of which contains a range of public 
opinion (1970). Because a voter in this P .R. system, in contrast to 
a party list system, can vote for individual candidates within the 
same and other parties, he can influence the composition of go-
vernment in a way that is impossible in most electoral systems. 
I agree with her that this form of P.R., as compared to the party 
list system, does produce relatively few parties, and thus relative-
ly stable government. Maltese and Irish political history bear this 
out, especially when compared to the rapid succession of multi-
party governing coalitions that have characterized post-war go-
vernments in Italy, and for example, the Netherlands. (No less 
than 20 political parties competed in the 1973 Dutch elections, 
and the governing coalition, formed only after three months of po-
litical horse-trading, consisted of five parties whose colours var-
ied widely). But as a result of the deals made between the candi-
dates themselves for their 'second preference votes', the choice a 
person has in theory to vote for a variety of individual candidates 
is often manipulated away (Bax Chapter 6; Boissevain 1965: 131). 
Furthermore, although Miss Lakeman enumerates the virtues of 
the single transferable vote form of P .R., she nowhere indicates 
that it strongly fosters patronage, subversion of civil servants, in-
ternal rivalry and factionalism within the parties. It does this by 
pitting candidates from the same party against each other in mul-
ti-member constituencies. There a candidate or a sitting member 
of parliament vies with other candidates from his own party in the 
same constituency for the allegiance of the same voters. Rival 
candidates from the same party are usually his worst enemies. As 
John Whyte noted in discussing the problems of a Dail Deputy, he 
cannot outbid them by offering a more attractive policy, because 
they are all bound by the same party programme. The only way he 
can outdistance them is by building up a greater reputation as a 
worker for his constituents (1966:19). 
Pressure on him to perform services for both voters and for civil 
servants, who must provide the prizes his electors seek, is in-
tense. The immense pressure on civil servants to provide the con-
tracts, jobs, transfers, licences, scholarships, and so on that com-
peting politicians from the governing party require to satisfy their 
constituents must not be underestimated. This corrupting influence 
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is inherent in the Maltese and Irish form of P.R. 
Duverger wrote many years ago that 'it is curious to note that 
the only countries in which the Fascist tendency has succeeded 
in finding corporate expression in parties represented in parliament 
are countries with proportional representation.' (Duverger, 1963, 
p.255). This I suggest is not only because P.R. makes it possible 
for such parties to gain representation, as Duverger argues, but 
also because P.R. through favouring multi-partism and government 
by coalitions favours the very conditions (weak leadership, govern-
ment instability, party factionalism, corruption, looting and malad-
ministration) which totalitarian parties promise to cure through the 
application of a 'strong hand'. 
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